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 34 
1. Introduction 35 
Geography is at the centre of trade policy. It defines trade flows. It structures the regulatory environment in which goods and 36 
services are sold and investments made. It is most evident in the ‘open versus closed’ dichotomy through which trade policy is 37 
currently viewed. The Trump Presidency in the US is often depicted as marking a sharp return to a more openly protectionist rhetoric 38 
along nationalist lines, evoking isolationism. Both sides debating the Brexit impasse have also used explicitly geographic narratives: 39 
advocates of Brexit have framed the EU as a barrier to the UK otherwise accessing global markets, while critics have focused on the 40 
need for continued ‘frictionless’ trade with the UK’s closest neighbours. Trade policy more generally operates in a political 41 
environment that involves multiple institutional levels, including the sub-national, national and global (see Goff & Broschek, in 42 
press). 43 
This article examines the use of geography as a means to politicize two key moments in the recent history of European Union (EU) 44 
trade policy: the World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations of the early to mid-45 
2000s, and the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, in the mid-2010s. The collapse of the TTIP 46 
negotiations, coming as it did in the context of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US President, might easily 47 
be viewed as yet another example of a ‘nationalist backlash’ against political and economic globalization. The TTIP campaign was, at 48 
some points, supported by political groups on the far-right, and even more left-wing activists utilized references to the restriction of 49 
national autonomy to help politicize TTIP as a ‘threat’ (e.g., Jones, 2014). Yet, to read politicization around TTIP only in reference to 50 
these groups and arguments misses the more variegated cleavages underpinning the politicization of trade policymaking. During 51 
both the earlier GATS talks and those focused on TTIP, NGOs, which played a central role in politicizing the respective negotiations, 52 
utilized a variety of geographic frames that drew on notions of both ‘national autonomy’ and ‘transnational solidarity’. As a result, 53 
their activities cannot be labelled simply as either ‘anti-’ or ‘pro-globalization’.  54 
The article begins in Section 2 by clarifying what is meant by ‘geographic frames’, and how these drive politicization by civil society 55 
actors. Section 2.1 then provides a discussion of the methods and sources used in the subsequent frame analysis. This is undertaken 56 
in sections 3 and 4, which focus on two campaign devices utilized across both periods. The first is transnational petitions, in which 57 
campaign groups formulate a series of joint demands which they or the public sign. The second is municipal-level trade contestation, 58 
where civil society actors work closely with local governments in support of their critical demands (Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). 59 
As we discuss in the concluding section 5, studying how campaigners utilize a mix of geographic frames has important implications. 60 
They are not merely descriptive of the activities and demands of civil society groups or mutually exclusive. Rather, they reflect a 61 
desire to engage with the public in a national context while also constructing a transnational network of activists. This leads us to 62 
rethink not only the politicization of trade policy, but also how to interpret the political conditions that constrain or favour trade 63 
negotiations, going beyond a simple picture of nationalism versus globalism. 64 
2. The role of geographic frames in politicization  65 
Civil society activists have been identified as key drivers of the politicization of EU trade policy over the past two decades (for a 66 
review, see Meunier & Czesana, 2019). They played a central role in bringing the GATS to public attention and are credited with 67 
spurring some shifts in the EU’s policy position in these negotiations (Strange, 2014, p. 158). Moreover, during the even more high-68 
profile TTIP talks, commentators have been at pains to stress that the key political cleavage to emerge was not between different 69 
economic interest groups, as conventional accounts of trade politics might have suggested, but between transatlantic business 70 
alliances supportive of the talks and NGOs that were broadly critical (Young, 2016).  71 
We argue that the social movement literature studying such groups uses comparable theoretical building blocks to the politicization 72 
literature. This latter literature has argued that three dimensions need to be in play to be able to speak of politicization: an 73 
‘expansion of actors and audiences’ engaged with an issue; issue ‘salience’ (significance); and, the ‘polarisation of opinion’ (de Wilde, 74 
Leupold & Schmidtke, 2016). The study of social movements, for its part, often adopts a ‘contentious politics’ approach focused on 75 
examining the claims made by civil society actors vis-à-vis governments. This is reminiscent of the notion of polarization, in this case 76 
between the ‘maker’ (social movement/civil society actor) and ‘receiver’ (often, but not exclusively, a government actor) of the claim 77 
(Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, pp. 7-12).  78 
Our more concrete focus here, however, is on relating the three dimensions of politicization to the strategic use of ‘collective action 79 
frames’ discussed in social movement scholarship. The collective action necessary for a social movement or more loosely organized 80 
transnational advocacy network (TAN) to emerge – which must be seen as a precondition of its ‘contentious claims-making’ – is 81 
dependent upon a common frame by which individuals may understand their shared activity, attract other individuals, and be 82 
represented to their target (e.g. a national government) (Benford & Snow, 2000). Such frames may be used to delineate the terms of 83 
polarization, defining in the eyes of activists who the maker and receiver of claims are. Where groups wish to increase the salience of 84 
a frame (and associated issue), they might focus on its ‘centrality’ to the lives of the intended target; its ‘experiential 85 
commensurability’ and its ‘cultural resonance’, ‘or what Campbell (1988) would call myths’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 619-622). 86 
Finally, where activists wish to drive actor expansion, recent scholarship on framing and ideas has emphasized the role of ‘polysemic’ 87 
or ambiguous frames (or ideas) as ‘coalition magnets’, strategically deployed by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to bridge potentially disparate 88 
interests (Béland & Cox, 2016). Multiple and ambiguous meanings are said to go hand-in-hand with higher levels of abstraction, 89 
where ideas or frames possess greater emotional appeal ‘because they tap into a core level of personal and group identity’ (Cox & 90 
Béland, 2013, p. 316). 91 
Although drawing on some of its building blocks, our approach does represent a key point of difference in respect of the literature on 92 
politicization. This latter body of work has often focused on how transfers of authority from the state to ‘higher’ levels, such as 93 
supranational organizations, might trigger a backlash (e.g. de Wilde, Leupold & Schmidtke, 2016). We argue, in contrast, that civil 94 
society groups do not just rely on emphasizing national sovereignty, painting supranational institutions as the enemy. Their collective 95 
action frames – and contentious politics more broadly – do not always rest on establishing a polarizing fault-line between political 96 
activity at the national and supranational levels. This is especially relevant where civil society organizations act across national 97 
borders, whether through sharing information, strategy, or engaging in coordinated action.   98 
Our argument is thus focused on how geography often becomes salient as a way in which collective action frames used by civil 99 
society groups to politicize and contest policy are structured (Cumbers, Routledge & Nativel, 2008). Such ‘geographic frames’ may 100 
express difference, by emphasizing the different national origins of activists (e.g. ‘Canadian’, ‘Kenyan’) and ‘national 101 
autonomy/sovereignty’, by underscoring the imposition of supranational rules on national governments. But they may also be used 102 
to express commonalities between activists that transcend national borders, especially where they might be considered abstract 103 
(e.g. ‘Global’, ‘Latin American’, ‘European’). For example, the emotional pull of a perceived community of ‘English-speaking peoples’ 104 
has motivated a, these days influential, TAN in favour of closer economic association between the UK and the Anglosphere and given 105 
legitimacy to the associated geographic frame prominently adopted by the UK Government of a ‘Global Britain’ (Bell & Vucetic, 2019; 106 
Daddow, 2019). This is in spite of the fact that actors within this network marry such frames with an emphasis on preserving UK 107 
‘sovereignty’ (Rosamond, 2019, p. 415).  108 
With multiple geographic frames sitting side-by-side, activists can be highly strategic with how they use them. In some cases, civil 109 
society organizations and TANs may subvert traditional hierarchical orders in order to place the ‘local’ alongside or above the 110 
‘national’ or even ‘global’ (Leitner, Sheppard & Sziarto, 2008). By challenging such orders, there is not a clear ranking in which the 111 
‘national’ has sole jurisdiction of the ‘local’, in which the latter can only access the ‘global’ via the former. Crucially, the binary 112 
between the ‘national/supranational’ is blurred where groups can utilize frames emphasizing national autonomy and transnational 113 
solidarity simultaneously to motivate support for their cause. Rather than represent a contradiction, the ambiguity and abstraction 114 
of these geographic frames allows them to act as effective ‘coalition magnets’, bringing together a broader coalition of groups. In this 115 
vein, geographic frames should not be mistaken as a mere description of a ‘movement’ or its demands but rather as part of a 116 
political process of self-representation (Strange, 2014; see also Smith, 2005). They should not simply be taken at face value as they 117 
represent deliberate political communication by civil society actors. 118 
Bringing together potentially disparate groups is especially significant when campaigning against trade agreements. These both 119 
transcend national boundaries and involve a multitude of different actors, who themselves often communicate with one another via 120 
a technical language premised on economic and legal expertise (see Hannah, Scott & Trommer, 2016). Civil society activists wishing 121 
to politicize such agreements therefore benefit from being able to operate across borders, but also from speaking to a variety of 122 
different audiences, notably translating the technical terminology and highlighting its significance to potential supporters.  123 
2.1 Research questions, methodology and sources 124 
Building on this framework, our article seeks to address three specific questions: 1) how do geographic frames serve as coalition 125 
magnets to link groups, such as those involved in forming a TAN, across borders, leading to actor expansion? 2) how do geographic 126 
frames define polarization between the makers and receivers of contentious claims, including across different geographic levels? 127 
And, 3) how do activists use geographic frames to draw out the salience of a trade negotiation so that it is seen as significant in the 128 
eyes of relevant actors? In addressing these questions, the article will also be closely examining the audiences to which different 129 
geographic frames are being addressed. 130 
Framing is undertaken wherever activists articulate their common position and demands, and therefore includes both oral and 131 
written communication, as well as potentially other devices. However, our frame analysis in this article focuses on two specific 132 
instruments – transnational petitions and municipal level trade contestation – as prominent means through which trade 133 
politicization was expressed during both the GATS and TTIP negotiations. In focusing on these instruments, we are not suggesting 134 
that the frames expressed here represented a unified civil society position – or that there was not a political debate between groups 135 
over the choice of frame to use. But, given limited space, we choose to focus on the frames as articulated through these two 136 
instruments for three reasons. Firstly, they involve the explicit and detailed statement of civil society frames in a public setting. They 137 
are also prima facie organized on different scales (transnational petitions/meetings versus local government motion), allowing us to 138 
explore whether multiple geographic frames are still used in each context. Finally, these instruments were consistently used across 139 
both campaign periods (GATS and TTIP), with similar organizations, notably members of the Seattle-to-Brussels (S2B) TAN (Gheyle, 140 
2019, p. 183), playing a role – allowing for comparison across time. In the remainder of this sub-section we provide an overview of 141 
the corpus of textual materials relating to these activities that we focus on in our analysis of civil society frames (see also Tables 1 142 
and 2). 143 
Transnational petitions are utilized by civil society to frame their network and its political demands, typically led by a small core of 144 
groups with most signatories (either individuals or other groups) asked only to provide their formal support (Strange, 2011). In turn, 145 
those nationally-based groups often use the petitions to represent their work when communicating with their supporters via online 146 
hyperlinks to the group hosting the petition on their website. Transnational petitions have taken two forms. During the GATS period, 147 
the focus was on ‘global group petitions’ (GGPs), or ‘online petitions typically framed as “global”, linking sometimes hundreds of 148 
advocacy groups behind a common set of critical statements targeting an institution of global governance’ and seen as a key 149 
instrument of TANs (Strange, 2011, p. 1237). There were five such anti-GATS GGPs, running from December 1999 to June 2005 (for 150 
an overview, see Table 1). TTIP campaigning took a different path to the GATS activity, in part due to the creation of the European 151 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). We see this as comparable to a GGP in purpose and transnational reach, but with its geographic scope more 152 
explicitly European. It came into being in 2011 as an EU institutional innovation to counter criticism of the EU’s supposed ‘democratic 153 
deficit’: one million electronic signatures to an ECI would oblige the Commission to respond (Szeligowska & Mincheva, 2012). The 154 
STOP TTIP ECI submitted for registration in July 2014 demanded that the Commission and EU Member States cease the TTIP 155 
negotiations and that CETA not be ratified (Efler et al., 2014). However, in September 2014, the Commission rejected registration of 156 
the ECI (EC decision C(2014) 6501). While this was not unusual, what was significant was that the organizers of the STOP TTIP ECI 157 
chose to create a ‘self-organized ECI’ (sECI), launching it only fifteen days later. Within a year, by early October, organizers ‘handed 158 
over’ what they claimed were 3,263,920 signatures from 23 Member States to the European Commission (Zalan, 2015). The 159 
organizers also appealed the Commission’s decision to deny the ECI registration, but the European Court of Justice’s finding, 160 
overturning the decision, was only announced in May 2017 (Case T-754/14) – after the TTIP negotiations were already on hiatus and 161 
CETA ratified by the European Parliament.  162 
Municipal-level trade contestation, meanwhile, has also taken two forms (see Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). The first has led 163 
activists to pressure municipalities into passing motions that were critical of the GATS and TTIP negotiations. Motions were generally 164 
based on templates prepared by NGOs associated with the S2B network, such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial 165 
Transactions and for Citizens’ Action, known by its French acronym ATTAC (see, e.g., GATSWatch, n.d.; TTIP Free Zones, 2019b). 166 
Given space constraints, we focus our analysis of the local motions on the frames featured in the templates used by ATTAC in Austria 167 
and France. These countries together accounted for most motions passed in both periods. During the GATS campaign, previous 168 
research has identified 744 motions in France and 388 in Austria (against just under 400 elsewhere); the equivalent figures for the 169 
TTIP campaign are 760 in France and 408 in Austria (against 846 elsewhere) (Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). In the case of France 170 
and the GATS period, we draw on the template used by ATTAC-Rhône, which is similar to that used by other local chapters (e.g. 171 
ATTAC 91, 2005).  172 
Municipal activism also involved the organization of a set of (transnational) meetings of NGOs and municipalities that served as 173 
evidence of campaign coordination. During the GATS period, the more France-focused ‘States-General of local authorities against 174 
GATS’ (Bobigny, November 2004) morphed into a European and, later, global ‘Convention for the Promotion of Public Services’, held 175 
respectively in Liège (October 2015) and Geneva (October 2016) (Crespy, 2016, p. 171; Convention Européenne des Collectivités 176 
Locales, 2005; Convention Internationale des Collectivités Locales, 2006). During the TTIP period, there was even stronger evidence 177 
of coordination of the various national municipality campaigns, which coalesced around the banner of ‘TTIP Free Zones Europe’. 178 
Transnational meetings of municipalities, with civil society participation as before (see, e.g., Council of Canadians, 2016), were 179 
organized in Barcelona (April 2016), Grenoble (February 2017) and Antwerp (March 2019) – although campaigning was already 180 
petering out by the time the second meeting was held (Pan-European Meeting of Local Authorities, 2016; Pan-European meeting of 181 
TTIP-free zones, 2017; Not Without Municipalities, 2019). The last meeting in Antwerp did not even issue a statement on their 182 
website. Anti-TTIP campaigners ran a single website mapping the extent of municipal engagement and providing an overview of 183 
some of the national templates that could be used by local activists (see TTIP Free Zones, 2019a).  184 
In the following sections we turn to analysing the frames contained within these campaign devices, illustrating how the groups 185 
involved have built solidarity across time. 186 
3. Solidarity in transnational petitions 187 
In the case of the anti-GATS group petitions, there was a combination of frames underscoring both national autonomy – in the 188 
national categorization of signatories and the emphasis on protecting governmental regulatory power – and global transnational 189 
solidarity (see Table 1 for an overview of the geographic frames and activist groups involved). The use of both ambiguous geographic 190 
frames enabled such petitions to serve a double purpose of: a) acting as a coalition magnet, leading to actor expansion through the 191 
construction of a transnational network, and b) underscoring the centrality of the issue to groups’ supporters in a national context, 192 
raising the salience of the GATS. Moreover, while in some cases the geographic frame set up an opposition between the policies 193 
adopted by supranational or multinational entities (such as the WTO or multinational corporations) and nation-states, petitions were 194 
also addressed from transnational activists to national governments. Polarization on this issue was thus not simply along a national-195 
supranational axis (‘we, national citizens/organizations, must resist the imposition of GATS by supranational institutions’). Rather, it 196 
reflected the juxtaposition of an alternative form of globalization advanced by social movements alongside traditional nation-centric 197 
models of political power also mobilized by these activists. 198 
Anti-GATS mobilization emerged in the aftermath of two apparent ‘success’ stories for campaign groups involved in what has been 199 
referred to as the ‘global justice movement’ (Della Porta, 2007): the collapse of the WTO’s Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 200 
December 1999 and the stalling in 1998 of negotiations towards a proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Egan, 2001). A 201 
critical GATS demand entered the first GATS-relevant GGP ‘WTO – Shrink or Sink!’ that activists groups published in the immediate 202 
aftermath of the Seattle protests (TWN, 1999). This framed GATS as a threat to government regulatory protection of ‘the 203 
environment, health, safety and other public interests’ (TWN, 1999). However, this petition and those that followed reflected a 204 
broader balancing act between emphasizing transnational/global solidarity and national sovereignty. Notably, ‘WTO – Shrink or Sink’ 205 
was used at the same time as one of two founding declarations of the ‘Our World Is Not For Sale’ (OWINFS) network. This was 206 
formed to facilitate much of the transnational civil society alliances that developed in the build-up and during the Seattle protests. 207 
The petition thus also sought to link people across borders in transnational solidarity, noting that ‘around the world in rich and poor 208 
nations alike, millions of people […] fight for a just and sustainable future and against corporate globalization’, whilst listing the 209 
signatory groups by country. Governments were presented as largely passive victims or, in the case of the more powerful, as tools 210 
for a ‘corporate elite’ and the ‘WTO’s allegedly neutral Secretariat’ (TWN, 1999).  211 
Similarly, the 2001 ‘Stop the GATS Attack Now’ GGP, promoted by North American and European groups, and coordinated by the 212 
Canadian Polaris institute, contained a mixture of geographic frames. It argued that the GATS 2000 negotiations ‘create vast new 213 
rights and access for multinational service providers and newly constrain government action taken in the public interest world wide’. 214 
It targeted national governments, who were asked to ‘immediately invoke a moratorium on the […] negotiations’ and then follow 215 
seven overlapping demands that included asserting governmental responsibility over public services towards basic rights; preventing 216 
foreign governments and corporations from undermining public interest laws; and, including citizen organizations within government 217 
representation at global trade and investment negotiations (AFTINET, 2001).  218 
That said, some differences in the articulation of the global solidarity frame could also be observed in the GGPs. The 2003 ‘Nairobi’ 219 
petition – which came out of a meeting in the Kenyan capital, organized by Polaris and European groups with representatives of 220 
African civil society from across the continent – specifically called upon ‘developing governments […] to promote, protect and 221 
reclaim the southern policy space, to review, with a view to withdraw, current commitments and therefore not to make any new 222 
commitments in current GATS negotiations’. Signatory groups were identified by name and country, and the petition was presented 223 
as a joint statement of transnational solidarity amongst those signatories (Action Aid Uganda et al., 2003). Similarly, the last petition 224 
critical of GATS from 2005 (‘Stop the GATS power play against citizens of the world!’) was intended to specifically critique the 225 
inclusion of services within the then still-ongoing Doha negotiations – since stalled – and problematized GATS as a threat to 226 
developing countries. It also reiterated the arguments developed in the earlier petitions that GATS was a device pushed by 227 
multinational service corporations to undermine national regulatory space (ARENA et al., 2005). It targeted the heads of Member-228 
state delegations to the WTO, as well as the WTO Secretariat and key Chairs involved in negotiating GATS 2000. As with most of the 229 
GATS-focused petitions, the signatories were identified by name and country, and were framed as ‘civil society organizations from 230 
around the world’. In contrast, while the 2003 ‘Evian’ petition signed by an international list of groups identified by their name and 231 
countries, it was more narrowly focused on the EU’s GATS negotiation position and demanded that it exclude water utilities on the 232 
basis that it threatened ‘vulnerable communities worldwide’ (11.11.11 et al., 2003). This may have reflected the fact that European 233 
groups utilized the anti-GATS campaign to develop a trans-European network intended to link the Seattle protests with the role of 234 
the European Commission at the WTO. Suitably titled, the ‘Seattle-to-Brussels’ (S2B) network effectively helped to share critical 235 
reports between groups, provided a common voice of critique addressed to EU Member States and the Commission’s Directorate-236 
General for Trade, and sometimes helped organize street protests (Strange, 2014).  237 
The TTIP (s)ECI also adopted a more explicitly ‘European’ geographic frame that focused less on either national autonomy or ‘global’ 238 
solidarity (see Table 1 for an overview). This was underpinned by three dynamics, each broadly corresponding to one of the 239 
dimensions of politicization discussed above. Firstly, the anti-TTIP campaign largely took place in Europe. The EU-US nature of the 240 
TTIP talks meant that contestation could have potentially been structured along a transatlantic frame, as reflected in the list of 241 
signatory groups to a December 2013 letter (which operated much like a GGP) demanding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 242 
be removed from the US-EU discussions (350.org, 2013). Of 132 group signatories, the majority were either EU- or US-based (86 and 243 
39 respectively). European/EU-based activists, however, ultimately found more traction for their campaign while US civil society 244 
groups focused their efforts on campaigning against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Negotiations on TPP were already more 245 
advanced and TTIP was perceived as less of a threat given EU levels of labour or environmental standards (Siles-Brügge, 2017, p. 246 
472). In the EU, the explicitly European, as opposed to transatlantic, framing of the sECI helped to not only underscore the centrality 247 
of TTIP to targets’ lives, but was also culturally and experientially resonant. It helped to draw out the salience of transatlantic 248 
negotiations as a specific threat to ‘European’ regulatory systems/standards – a key element of the civil society campaign against 249 
TTIP (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019, Ch. 4) – in what has referred been to as ‘[m]ythmaking in European identity’ (2017, p. 797).  250 
Secondly, the European frame was also linked to the decision to pursue an ECI – even after the Commission’s rejection of the initial 251 
attempt at registration – despite the additional constraints this imposed. Although the ECI format featured stringent character limits 252 
(see European Commission, 2019), organizers chose to maintain the same short text for use within the signatory forms of the sECI. 253 
Organizers also not only established a citizens’ committee, but also publicly touted the fact that they had met Member State 254 
signature thresholds as prescribed in the relevant EU rules governing ECIs (Efler et al., 2014; McKeagney, 2015; Taylor, 2015). As 255 
Oleart & Bouza (2018) have noted in a comparison of several ECIs, including the one critical of TTIP (‘STOP TTIP’), organizers must, 256 
when writing the petition text, have in mind both a European audience of potential signatories as well as the European decision-257 
makers to whom the ECI is formally addressed. The text of the STOP TTIP sECI thus presented TTIP and CETA as a ‘threat to 258 
democracy and the rule of law’. It also repeated similar themes seen in the GATS petitions. Specifically, it sought ‘to prevent 259 
employment, social, environmental, privacy and consumer standards from being lowered and public services (such as water) and 260 
cultural assets from being deregulated in non-transparent negotiations’. However, there was no mention of national autonomy; 261 
instead organizers ‘support[ed] an alternative trade and investment policy in the EU’ (Efler et al., 2014). The framing thus put 262 
different types of European actors and policies in opposition to each other within a single public sphere (see also Oleart & Bouza, 263 
2018), rather than polarizing national and supranational actors and levels of political activity. 264 
Thirdly, the transnational ‘European’ frame seen here was not exclusively a product of the formal requirement that ECIs be written 265 
to a trans-EU audience. A product of a wider European ‘Stop TTIP Alliance’, its creation and, more importantly, the civil society 266 
activity that ensured its life after being rejected by the Commission, was also closely linked to the support of the S2B network (Oleart 267 
& Bouza, 2018, pp. 879-880). Individuals named as its supporters, such as Susan George or John Hilary, were embedded within S2B. 268 
Its activists had sought to politicize EU trade negotiations in the period between the GATS and TTIP, but it was only with the launch 269 
of the TTIP talks in the summer of 2013 that S2B’s efforts played a key role in re-igniting the wider politicization of EU trade policy 270 
(Siles-Brügge, 2017, pp. 470, 472-3). In collecting signatures for the self-organized ECI, national groups such as 11.11.11 in Belgium 271 
and GJN in the UK played similar roles to their work during the GATS campaign. While there may have been unevenness in the 272 
number of signatures collected by the Stop TTIP sECI across Member States, the activity itself was nevertheless characterized by a 273 
transnational/European frame and collaboration. The appeal to a polysemic European frame served as a coalition magnet sustaining 274 
the expansion of civil society and other actors concerned with TTIP (Gheyle, 2019, pp. 195-199). This is underscored by the fact that 275 
groups deliberately chose the procedural constraints of an EU-level petition even after it had been rejected. 276 
Table 1 – Geographic frames in transnational petitions 277 
 Civil society groups involved 
 
Components of framing strategy and politicization 
 
GATS campaign  
 WTO – Shrink or Sink! (1999) 
 Stop the GATS Attack Now! 
(2001) 
 Nairobi Civil Society Declaration 
on the GATS (2003) 
 Evian Challenge (2003) 
 Stop the GATS power play 
against citizens of the world 
(2005) 
 
WTO – Shrink or Sink! (1999) 
 OWINFS network (429 
signatories). 
 
Stop the GATS Attack Now! 
(2001) 
 Polaris Institute, 
European and North 
American groups (563 
signatories from 63 
countries). 
 
Nairobi Civil Society 
Declaration on the GATS 
(2003) 






Evian Challenge (2003) 
 146 international 
signatories. 
 
Centrality (to increase salience) 
National autonomy:  
 GATS undermines government regulatory power; 
 National categorization of signatories. 
 
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion) 
Global solidarity in the fight against corporate power. At 
times a focus on solidarity with developing countries and 
at others on those affected by EU policies. 
 
Defining the terms of polarization 
Opposition not just between national and supranational 
actors (e.g. WTO), but also between transnational actors 
(activists) and nation-states over the desirable form of 
globalization.  
 
Stop the GATS power play 
against citizens of the world 
(2005) 




 (Self-organized) European 
Citizens’ Initiative (2014-15/17) 
‘Stop TTIP Alliance’, closely 
linked to Seattle-to-Brussels. 
Citizens’ committee included 
Michael Efler (Mehr 
Demokratie), Susan George 
(Transnational Institute) and 
John Hilary (from War on 
Want) 
Centrality, cultural resonance and experiential 
commensurability (to increase salience) 
TTIP as a threat to European standards. 
 
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion) 
European solidarity as a means of sustaining pan-
European cooperation. 
 
Defining the terms of polarization 
Opposition between different types of European actor 
and policy. 
 
Sources: TWN (1999); AFTINET (2001); Action Aid Uganda et al. (2003); 11.11.11 et al. (2003); ARENA (2005); Efler et al. (2014). 278 
 279 
4. Municipal-level trade contestation: from the global to the local 280 
In addition to transnational petitions, both the anti-GATS and anti-TTIP campaigns saw civil society groups turn to ‘municipal level 281 
trade contestation’ as a central device to politicize the negotiations. Activists engaged in a series of concerted efforts to push local, 282 
and some regional, governments into passing motions that were critical of these agreements, often based on a template. Their 283 
efforts saw local governments across largely Western Europe pass many hundreds of motions over both campaign periods (Siles-284 
Brügge & Strange, in press). The context for this campaigning was mainly a national one, with campaign groups affiliated with S2B 285 
often taking the lead in producing the templates used by local campaigners. As a result, the motions were often addressed to 286 
national policymakers who could act where local politicians’ competences were seen to be circumscribed. In addition, meetings 287 
involving both municipalities and campaigners were organized over both campaign periods, with several issuing summary 288 
‘resolutions’ or ‘declarations’. These reflected efforts at transnational collaboration – to expand the number of actors active on the 289 
issue – while also being directed more explicitly at policymakers in the TTIP years. There was also a clear overlap between the 290 
national/supranational organizations involved in the sECI/transnational group petitions and the municipal campaigning efforts, which 291 
bore the clear imprint of S2B and the wider ‘Stop TTIP Alliance’ (see TTIP Free Zones, 2019b).  292 
The template resolutions we study here – from the French and Austrian chapters of ATTAC – were focused on rendering the distant 293 
concept of international trade negotiations salient for local government representatives and their citizens. They highlighted the 294 
possible effects these might have at the local (and national) level, i.e. their ‘centrality’ to peoples’ lives (see Table 2 for an overview 295 
of geographic frames and activist groups involved). In the case of the anti-GATS campaign, supranational authority and/or rules were 296 
framed as a threat to local and national government autonomy. Polarization was thus also on a national-supranational axis. Thus, a 297 
French ATTAC template resolution spoke of how ‘GATS applies to all administrative levels, from the State to the communes’ and of 298 
how international rules limited the ‘room for manoeuvre’ of local (government) representatives (authors’ translation of ATTAC-299 
Rhône, 2005, p. 21). In the case of the Austrian GATS template, the threat to local government service provision was said to come 300 
from the intensification of EU competitiveness logics implied by the GATS, although it did also emphasize more positive elements of 301 
the EU legal order, notably, the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution also underscored the closeness of local government to 302 
citizens, in what might be seen as an attempt to increase the commensurability with individuals’ lived experience (STOPP-GATS 303 
Kampagne, 2004, pp. 78-79).  304 
The geographic framing during the TTIP period was different. The French national template on TTIP and CETA highlighted how ‘ISDS 305 
would grant investors exclusive rights to attack states when democratic decisions – taken by public institutions, including local 306 
authorities’ went against their economic interests. It also rejected any attempts at ‘weakening the national or European regulatory 307 
framework’ or the ‘erosion [of local government] capacity to organize and regulate local sustainable development in the general 308 
interest’ (authors’ translation of Collectif Stop TAFTA, n.d., pp. 1, 2). Rather than seeing trade agreements as reinforcing a negative 309 
EU political order, as during the GATS period, the Austrian template emphasized how they undermined the EU subsidiarity principle 310 
by ‘constraining’ local decision-maker ‘autonomy’ (authors’ translation of TTIP Stoppen, 2014, pp. 1-2). Trade agreements remained 311 
salient to the local level, but the axis of polarization shifted. The core issue was less the imposition of rules from supranational 312 
(global and European) to national and local levels of decision-making, but rather the constraints placed on democratic decision-313 
making bodies at several levels. 314 
Beyond the more obvious call for a rejection of the relevant trade agreements, the way in which the resolutions framed the 315 
negotiating process and their target audience underscored the nationally-based campaigning context for these resolutions, which 316 
sought to encourage an expansion in the range of domestic actors taking issue with the GATS. A focus on questions of process was 317 
also more ambiguous than statements on content. Both French and Austrian sample resolutions highlighted the lack of transparency 318 
in the GATS/TTIP negotiations. The French motions also emphasized the non-involvement of local governments specifically and 319 
demanded ‘the opening of a national debate’ on the GATS/TTIP. Meanwhile, the Austrian motions were predominantly directed at 320 
national and regional policymakers; the only exception was a reference to Members of the European Parliament in the TTIP sample 321 
motion (ATTAC-Rhône, 2005, p. 21; STOPP-GATS Kampagne, 2004, p. 78; Collectif Stop TAFTA, n.d., pp. 1, 2; TTIP Stoppen, 2014, p. 322 
1).  323 
In contrast, the declarations and resolutions issued at international meetings of municipalities sought to more explicitly link local 324 
campaigning and trade policy impacts, which had the greatest immediate centrality and experiential commensurability, to 325 
transnational problems and activism in an effort to act as a transnational coalition magnet. That said, the nature of transnational 326 
solidarity being articulated through polysemic geographic frames varied across both campaign periods, mirroring the shift in 327 
discourse between the GATS-related GGPs and the TTIP sECI. The declarations/resolutions to come out of the 328 
‘European/International Convention for the Promotion of Public Services’ (for the GATS period) and the ‘Meeting of Local 329 
Authorities/TTIP Free Zones’ (for the TTIP period) saw a shift from relying on a greater mix of geographic frames to focusing much 330 
more explicitly on the link between the local and the European level (see Table 2 for an overview).  331 
It is not unreasonable to see this as partly reflecting the changed subject matter (global versus transatlantic negotiations), and the 332 
desire in the GATS period to appeal beyond (Western) Europe, which saw the vast majority of anti-GATS motions (Siles-Brügge & 333 
Strange, in press). The initial Liège Resolution was authored by ‘elected representatives from several European countries’; ‘trade 334 
unionists’ from the ‘local, national and international’ levels and members of civil society organizations concerned with global issues 335 
(authors’ translation of Convention Européenne des Collectivités Locales, 2005, p. 1). Authorship of the Geneva Declaration, 336 
however, was additionally attributed to local government representatives from Canada and South Africa (Convention Internationale 337 
des Collectivités Locales, 2006, p. 1), with the Convention going from being framed as ‘European’ to ‘Global’. However, authorship of 338 
the Barcelona and Grenoble Declarations was narrower than the transatlantic scope of the talks. Only European municipalities were 339 
listed as signatories – despite the presence and role of SMOs in coordinating the pan-European campaign and meeting (see TTIP Free 340 
Zones, 2019b) – and the broader TTIP Free Zones campaign itself was explicitly European in scope (TTIP Free Zones, 2019a). The 341 
Barcelona Declaration, however, did ‘celebrate the social movement which has made [a] European debate possible’ (Pan-European 342 
Meeting of Local Authorities, 2016, p. 2). 343 
As for the national templates, the move from the GATS to the TTIP period also saw the frame around the restriction of national and 344 
local autonomy shift away from emphasizing the imposition of supranational rules. In other words, polarization on the issue was no 345 
longer simply defined in terms of an opposition between national and supranational actors and policies, but rather in terms of actors 346 
inhabiting the same European public sphere/level (see Oleart & Bouza, 2018). The Liège resolution emphasized the risks of WTO-347 
imposed (public) services liberalization for ‘international, national and local legislation’, while also highlighting how EU and national 348 
policies endangered public services (authors’ translation of Convention Européenne des Collectivités Locales, 2005, p. 1). The Geneva 349 
Declaration, meanwhile, similarly stressed the problems associated with the global marketization of public services driven by the 350 
WTO, in partnership with the European Commission, with national governments showing ‘zeal’ in ‘accept[ing] and put[ting] into 351 
practice’ this agenda (authors’ translation of Convention Internationale des Collectivités Locales, 2006, p. 1). In contrast, the central 352 
diagnostic in the Barcelona Declaration was that at a time of EU crises, ‘new generation trade agreements’ (TTIP, CETA, TiSA) 353 
undermined the ‘core’ values that the European project should be guided by (‘solidarity, respect of freedoms and justice’) and 354 
instead ‘put at risk [local authorities’] capacity to legislate and use public funds’. The ‘treaties [were] being negotiated in a non-355 
transparent manner, not fulfilling European democratic and participatory standards’ (Pan-European Meeting of Local Authorities, 356 
2016, p. 1). The Grenoble Declaration of February 2017 was very similar in its focus on a European problématique. At a time of EU 357 
crisis, ‘new-general free-trade agreements’ undermine ‘fundamental values’ that should be at the heart of European initiatives to 358 
‘reinforc[e] social, economic, environmental and labour rights’. Notably, the Declaration emphasized that ‘[o]nly rebuilding 359 
democracy and reinventing the relationship with citizens can fight the rise of nationalist and xenophobic ideas’, alluding to the 360 
‘[t]housands of initiatives […] already set in motion […] in cities and regions’ (Pan-European meeting of TTIP-free zones, 2017). 361 
Rejecting economic nationalism went hand in hand with accentuating the links between the local/regional and the European.  362 
 363 
Coupled with the shift in authorship, the reconfiguration of geographic frames might also be explained by the fact that these latter 364 
declarations were not only part of an explicitly European campaign (‘TTIP Free zones’), but were also presented as statements from 365 
‘governmental’ authorities to decision-makers in the EU, national governments and other relevant institutions. Explicitly invoking 366 
‘European’ values may have served a dual purpose here. For one, it reflected a reliance on a strategy of what has been called 367 
‘mimetic challenge’, whereby weaker actors are empowered to challenge authority by adopting techniques and styles such that they 368 
nevertheless appear as if conforming (Seabrooke & Hobson 2007, p. 16; Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). Moreover, and as for the 369 
(s)ECI, the focus on the European level, as opposed to transatlantic solidarity, allowed the TTIP/CETA-related declarations to 370 
emphasize the specific concerns civil society were raising about ‘European’ regulatory standards, such as the emphasis they placed 371 
on the potential dilution of precautionary risk regulation. Such framing not only emphasized the centrality and experiential 372 
commensurability of the issue, but was also culturally resonant. Finally, the Grenoble Declaration emerged in a context where 373 
opponents of the EU’s trade agenda were increasingly tarred with the brush of being economic nationalists after the votes for Brexit 374 
and Donald Trump. Differentiating their position became a more pressing concern for European civil society campaigning on trade 375 
issues (Siles-Brügge, 2017).  376 
 377 
Table 2 – Geographic frames in municipal-level trade contestation 378 
 Device Groups involved 
 


















Centrality and experiential 
commensurability (to increase salience) 
GATS is applicable to and constrains local 
decision-making, which is close to citizens. 
 
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion) 
Motions addressed to national policymakers 
and speaking to questions of process. 
 
Defining the terms of polarization 
GATS represents an imposition on local and 
national governments by international rules 












Stated authors of the Liège 
Resolution are European local 
government representatives, 
‘local, national and 
international’ trade unionists 
and civil society organization 
representatives (authors’ 
translation of Convention 
Européenne des Collectivités 
Locales, 2005, p. 1). 
 
Stated authors of the Geneva 
Resolution  are European, 
Canadian and South African 
local government 
Centrality and experiential 
commensurability (to increase salience) 
Relevance of GATS to the local level. 
 
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion) 
Link between local and global implications of 
GATS, e.g. Convention name shifted from 
‘European’ (Liège) to ‘Global’ (Geneva). 
 
Defining the terms of polarization 
representatives, ‘local, 
national and international’ 
trade unionists and civil 
society organization 
representatives (authors’ 
translation of Convention 
Internationale des 
Collectivités Locales, 2006, p. 
1). 
The imposition of supranational rules on 
‘international, national and local legislation’ 
(authors’ translation of Convention 
Européenne des Collectivités Locales, 2005, 
p. 1). 














Centrality and experiential 
commensurability (to increase salience) 
TTIP threatens local, national and European 
regulation. 
 
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion) 
Motions addressed to national policymakers 
and speaking to questions of process. 
 
Defining the terms of polarization 
Supranational negotiations threaten 
democratic decision-making at various levels 










TTIP Free Zones Europe, with 
links to Seattle-to-Brussels 
and the wider ‘Stop TTIP 
Alliance’. 
Centrality, cultural resonance and 
experiential commensurability (to increase 
salience) 
TTIP undermines European regulatory 
standards. 
 
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion) 
European focus: signatories of declarations 
are European municipalities only. Focus on 
European-level debate. 
 
Defining the terms of polarization 
The local inhabits a European public sphere: 
TTIP as a threat to European values. 
Sources: STOPP-GATS Kampagne (2004); ATTAC-Rhône (2005); Convention Européenne des Collectivités Locales (2005); Convention 379 
Internationale des Collectivités Locales (2006); Collectif Stop TAFTA (n.d.); TTIP Stoppen (2014); Pan-European Meeting of Local 380 
Authorities (2016); Pan-European meeting of TTIP-free zones (2017); TTIP Free Zones (2019a, 2019b). 381 
 382 
5. Conclusion 383 
Our central argument in this article has been that the politicization of trade negotiations is not just about a pro-sovereignty backlash 384 
in the face of the supranational exercise of authority. The collective action frames that civil society actors rely on to politicize trade 385 
negotiations often emphasize multiple geographies as a means of targeting different authoritative actors, as well as communicating 386 
to various supportive audiences.  387 
In both the GATS and TTIP cases, the wider public was commonly addressed via national campaigns, with trade negotiations often 388 
framed as a threat to (national) ‘government autonomy’ as a means of drawing out the salience of the issue. While such frames 389 
appeared in the transnational petitions we studied for the GATS period, it was most explicit in the case of municipal level trade 390 
contestation, where sample motions focused specifically on the risks of trade agreements for the autonomy of local governments. 391 
This made sense as a tactic to politicize local government and citizens – helping to polarize the issue. The focus on the local impacts 392 
of trade agreements allowed activists to highlight the centrality and experiential commensurability of trade policy without as much 393 
emphasis on national sovereignty. Moreover, in both the petitions and the municipal level activism, the demand for ‘national/local 394 
autonomy’ was made in the context of frames calling for ‘transnational solidarity’, which as polysemic articulations served as 395 
coalition magnets in the building of broader coalitions (actor expansion). Both moments of politicization were dominated by 396 
European actors, with much of the group-to-group relations within civil society channelled through the trans-European S2B network. 397 
As evident in the various GGPs that served to articulate and develop the S2B’s network, activists consciously chose to combine 398 
identification by group and nationality, on one side, with transnational solidaric demands. The resolutions issued by transnational 399 
groupings of municipalities in the GATS period also combined such mixed geographic frames. 400 
During the GATS talks, transnational solidaric demands were more global in their reach, in part due to the more encompassing 401 
nature of the respective trade negotiations, with a claim that the proposed agreement was a particular threat to developing 402 
countries. Despite being a transatlantic negotiation with potential repercussions for other parts of the globe, the TTIP campaign 403 
narrowed to focus on the European scene. With US domestic politics focused on the TPP and difficulties in presenting EU rules as a 404 
threat to US consumer and labour rights, the EU and its Member States provided a richer ground for activists to contest TTIP in 405 
culturally and experientially resonant terms, drawing out the salience of the talks as a threat to ‘European standards’. The ECI was 406 
also in part responsible for the more ‘European’ frame of the TTIP campaign, with activists choosing to ‘self-organize’ and collect 407 
signatures for their own sECI after being initially rejected registration by the Commission. The ensuing ‘European’ framing of the 408 
petition was therefore quite deliberate and illustrative of efforts to sustain transnational solidarity and expand activism. Choosing to 409 
maintain the text and criteria for the formal ECI, activists presented an alternative vision of European integration to that driven by 410 
the Commission. The same can be said of the transnational declarations issued by municipalities in the TTIP period, which later also 411 
explicitly sought to differentiate their criticism of ‘new generation trade agreements’ from economic populism. Local government 412 
motions prepared by activists in this period also put less emphasis than before on the imposition of supranational rules: political 413 
polarization took place within a European public sphere (see also Oleart & Bouza, 2018). 414 
Understanding that geographic frames are not just descriptive of ‘movements’ or NGO demands but, rather, key drivers themselves 415 
of politicization, is important to how we study the formation and mobilization of civil society networks. With specific regard to the 416 
politicization of trade policy, we need to be careful not to dismiss it as a simple ‘nationalist backlash’, but instead examine where 417 
activist demands are also supportive of transnational cooperation. Our finding thus challenges the ‘transfer of authority’ thesis 418 
widely found in the politicization literature. It invites us to think about the specific critiques of trade agreements articulated by civil 419 
society activists, which may be supportive of certain kinds of supranational policymaking – as the authors of the Barcelona and 420 
Grenoble Declarations in particular have been at pains to stress. In practice, critics of trade negotiations may therefore well have 421 
much more in common with trade negotiators than either side acknowledge. Claims such activists are ‘protectionist’ or ‘anti-422 
globalist’ create false binaries that unnecessarily obfuscate the political issues at hand. 423 
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